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ABSTRACT
What explains variation in European citizens’ support for common EU
immigration and counter-terrorism policies? We advance extant literature that
focuses on the utility versus identity debate by focusing on individuals’
emotional reactions. Drawing on theories of aﬀect, we show that citizens’
emotions about immigration are integral to their preferences for EU
cooperation on the dual questions of immigration and terrorism. We
hypothesise that while anger about immigration is associated with opposition
to cooperation on both policies, fear about immigration is associated with
support for a common EU counter-terrorism strategy. Using a large-N cross-
sectional survey conducted in Germany and the Netherlands, our analyses
conﬁrm our hypotheses. Our ﬁndings have implications for the progress of
European integration and the scope of public approval of EU common policies.
KEYWORDS Anger; anxiety; European integration; immigration; public opinion; terrorism
Introduction
The inﬂux of more than 1.5 million refugees, asylum seekers and migrants into
Europe, especially since the war in Syria, has coincided with immigration and
terrorism becoming the two most important issues for European Union (EU)
citizens, replacing economics (Eurobarometer 2018). Although the vast
majority of refugees are hosted in non-EU member states and immigration
also occurs within the EU (Vasilopoulou and Talving 2019), the European
immigration crisis has attracted signiﬁcant attention for at least two
reasons. First, host-country nationals may perceive this new ﬂow of people
as a potential threat to their existing social and demographic fabric.
Second, the origin and religion of the majority of refugees has allowed far
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right political actors not only to politicise identity, religious and value-based
diﬀerences in their campaigns, but also to link immigration to terrorism.
To address immigration and security-related challenges, European govern-
ments are faced with two options. The ﬁrst possibility is to address these
issues domestically. Some EU member states, such as Italy, Hungary and
Poland, have taken unilateral action against the EU’s oﬃcial line. The
second option is to deal with these issues through cooperation at the EU
level, which might allow member states to share the burden of immigration,
protect refugees and collectively ﬁght terrorism. The challenge here is to build
a strong multilateral framework while at the same time ensuring public
approval of all these initiatives.
Against this background, this article examines the impact of citizens’
emotional reactions to immigration towards their preferences for common
EU immigration and counter-terrorism policies. Emotions inﬂuence the ways
in which individuals perceive and process threats and how they form their
opinions (Brader and Marcus 2013; Redlawsk and Pierce 2017). Previous
work has examined the eﬀects of emotions across policy domains, including
terrorism (e.g., Lerner and Keltner 2000, 2001; Huddy et al., 2005, 2007), immi-
gration (e.g., Brader et al. 2008; Erisen and Kentmen-Cin 2017), climate change
(Davydova et al. 2018), and economic crisis (Magni 2017). Following the same
scholarly strand, we draw on theories of aﬀect and posit that emotional reac-
tions triggered by immigration inﬂuence the extent to which citizens prefer
domestic over international solutions to the dual questions of immigration
and terrorism.
Using evidence from two online surveys conducted in Germany and the
Netherlands in 2015–2016, our study makes a three-fold contribution. First,
we ﬁll a gap in the literature on Euroscepticism by focusing on preferences
for international cooperation on immigration and terrorism. Existing research
has focused on preferences for renegotiation (Vasilopoulou and Wagner
2017), widening versus deepening (Hobolt 2014), European economic govern-
ance (Kuhn and Stoeckel 2014), EU freedom of movement (Vasilopoulou and
Talving 2019) and trust in EU institutions (Armingeon and Ceka 2014).
However, we still do not know how Europeans view EU cooperation on the
questions of immigration and terrorism, whether they view the two policies
as related, and what explains variation in their sentiment towards these two
highly salient issues.
Second, we examine the emotional underpinnings of preference formation
speciﬁcally in the context of EU public opinion. By and large, political science
has drawn upon political economy and cultural/identity approaches in order
to explain both attitudes towards immigration and public support for Euro-
pean integration (Hobolt and De Vries 2016; Hainmueller and Hopkins
2014). In doing so, it has ignored the impact of the psychological processes
that may underpin attitude formation, and are often better at explaining
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short-term changes (Erisen 2017; Magni 2017; Vasilopoulos 2018). In addition,
research exploring the role of emotions in understanding citizen concerns
about immigration primarily focuses on the American context (Brader et al.
2008). The role of emotional reactions in attitudes towards the EU is limited
(see Garry 2014; Vasilopoulou and Wagner 2017). No contribution has expli-
citly addressed the speciﬁc impact of immigration-related emotions on EU
cooperation in this ﬁeld, despite the fact that immigration is an emotionally
loaded political issue at the forefront of domestic and EU-level debates.
Third, by incorporating theories of aﬀect into the study of EU policy
cooperation, we show that distinct emotions have divergent eﬀects on
people’s preferences. Anger about immigration leads individuals to oppose
EU level cooperation on both immigration and terrorism, essentially preferring
that these policies are exclusively managed at the nation-state level. Anxious
individuals, on the other hand, support national sovereignty on the question
of immigration, but EU decision-making in the ﬁeld of terrorism. Our results
are robust as they hold controlling for key variables, including trust, European
identity and hostility against immigration. Our ﬁndings have implications for
the progress of European integration and the scope of public approval of EU
common policies.
Emotional reactions to immigration and attitudes towards EU
policy cooperation
Research in political psychology suggests that a combination of conscious and
preconscious appraisals generate discrete emotions, including anger, fear and
enthusiasm (Berkowitz and Harmon-Jones 2004). Anger and fear on the one
hand tend to be activated by situations where people feel under threat,
e.g., terrorist threats (Huddy et al. 2005; Iyer et al. 2014). Although these
emotions can be experienced simultaneously, they tend to derive from
diﬀerent factors. A threat stimulus activates anger when the individual per-
ceives a high degree of normative violation perpetrated by external actors
(MacKuen et al. 2010). Anxiety, on the other hand, is activated by the
novelty or uncertainty of a situation, or a sense of lack of resources to
control that situation (Huddy et al. 2005, 2007; Albertson and Gadarian
2015). Enthusiasm is linked to individuals’ exposure to positive and reassuring
evidence of prior preferences (Brader and Marcus 2013). These emotions, in
turn, initiate distinct, but associated, attitudes and behavioural outcomes.
The aﬀective intelligence theory suggests that anger activates the disposi-
tion system (MacKuen et al. 2010; Brader and Marcus 2013). Angry individuals
are more likely to rely on habitual routines and seek to remove threats
through, often, aggressive and risk-taking preferences. They are less likely
to look out for information and prone to resist information that undermines
their existing beliefs. The moral violation aspect of anger is important as it
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primarily provides the motivation for action. Blameworthy actions or events
that cause undesirable outcomes tend to trigger anger (Smith and Kirby
2004). These situations include events where people tend to get angry due
to a perceived moral failure arising from a situation or a perceived violation
of moral norms. Anger tends to curtail democratic deliberation and fuel
biased reactions to political arguments (Suhay and Erisen 2018).
Fear, on the other hand, activates the surveillance system (Brader and
Marcus 2013). It functions as an interruption mechanism, which heightens
an individual’s perception of risk and tends to be associated with heightened
vigilance, risk-averse behaviour and compromise (Lazarus 1991). It, thus,
increases an individual’s propensity to seek out for new information about
the threatening stimulus, deep and eﬀortful processing of knowledge, and
decreases reliance on long-standing political beliefs and partisanship
(Marcus and MacKuen 1993). Enthusiasm is diﬀerent to both anger and fear
in that it has a positive valence. It is similar to anger, however, because it
also activates the disposition system (Marcus et al. 2000). Enthusiasm tends
to strengthen reliance to prior convictions and habitual routines.
The question of immigration is likely to trigger diﬀerent emotional
responses across the public (Brader et al. 2008; Erisen et al. 2014). Immigration
is a transnational and controversial issue. It is related to multiple policy issues
including the economy, cultural integration, criteria of entitlement and demo-
graphic change. Some members of the public may respond to immigration
with enthusiasm. These individuals tend to view immigration as a way of
enriching the national culture and bringing vital skills and human capital to
the host country. Others may perceive immigration as a threat. Such con-
scious or preconscious appraisals of migration may elicit anger and fear.
Anger will be triggered when immigration is interpreted as a normative viola-
tion, such as viewing immigrants as a threat to the existing social and moral
order. This emotional state is less related to the actual dangers and risks
arising from immigration. Rather, immigration is perceived as an unfair disrup-
tion to a person’s desired condition (Vasilopoulos et al. 2018). Fear, on the
other hand, will be activated when immigration is perceived as something
new with unpredictable consequences. Uncertainty is more likely to trigger
fearful reactions, turning individuals to breaking from their habitual routines
and engaging in information-seeking (Valentino et al. 2011; Erisen 2018).
One possible policy approach to address public concerns about immi-
grants is to develop a common cross-country strategy dealing with immigra-
tion and terrorism at the EU level. However, supranational policies in these
areas also have the potential to inﬂuence immigrant volume, rights and
duties of residents, crime rates, security concerns, social identities, and
national and individual economic considerations (Erisen and Kentmen-Cin
2017; Luedtke 2011). We posit that emotional dispositions towards immi-
grants inﬂuence attitudes towards ﬁrst, common EU immigration policy;
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second, common EU counter-terrorism strategy; and third, combinations of
the two policies.
Starting with immigration policy, we argue that those who are enthusiastic
about immigrants would support a common EU policy on immigration. The key
EU competence in this sphere is to set the conditions for immigrants’ entry and
legal residence in EU member states. EU cooperation in the ﬁeld of immigra-
tion is intended to provide international protection for those in need –
although often the content of EU policies has been criticised (Trauner 2016; Sci-
pioni 2018). Common international standards aim to improve the status of
immigrants, and are often perceived as encouraging more people to
migrate to Europe. If enthusiasm ‘increases people’s preferences for variety
and broaden their arrays of acceptable behavioural options’ (Fredrickson
et al. 2003: 368; Kahn and Isen 1993), then, those who are enthusiastic about
immigrants would be more willing to receive immigration ﬂows and to
provide immigrants with better legal, political and economic standards.
Those who feel angry about immigration, on the other hand, would oppose
EU cooperation on immigration. Such individuals view immigration as a threat
violating existing moral values and social standards and would seek to remove
this threat through risky and often confrontational strategies (MacKuen et al.
2010; Erisen 2018; Vasilopoulos et al. 2018). The EU is an external actor that,
by its actions,maybe seenas challengingnational power andcontrol over immi-
gration policy. For example, angry individuals may view EU initiatives, such as
the Commission’s proposals on asylum-seeker relocation and resettlement1 as
having the potential to attract more people into Europe, thus further contribut-
ing to the perceived threat of immigration. By deﬁnition, anger evokes attribu-
tion thought towards external actors (Lazarus 1991, Berkowitz and Harmon-
Jones 2004), and as such, people angry about immigration are likely to place
blame on the EU for their immigration concerns (Smith and Kirby 2004). The
EU would be seen as the external illegitimate actor that does not allow the
nation-state to take drastic unilateral action to address the immigrant threat.
Angry individuals would thus seek to take aggressive action to remove the
‘immigrant threat’ through opposition to EU cooperation on this policy issue
and support for national control of immigration. Given that such individuals
tend to rely on heuristics, for them, a protective immigration policy that is
designed in the habitual place of the nation-state is more likely to be directly
responsive to national sociotropic needs. An aggressive-disruptive position
against immigration cooperation at the EU level would enable retaining per-
ceived control over this policy issue; or at least it would contribute to a feeling
of maintaining control of this policy closer at home.
Hypothesis 1: Enthusiasm about immigration increases support for EU cooperation
on immigration policy, whilst anger decreases it (1a); Anger about immigration
increases support for national control of immigration policy (1b).
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Our second set of hypotheses relates to the impact of emotions on attitudes
towards the creation of a common EU counter-terrorism strategy. Terrorism is
one of the two top issues in contemporary European politics (Eurobarometer
2018). Yet, just as on immigration, a common EU approach on terrorism, has
not yet been formalised. Borders are at the heart of this discussion as they
serve to deﬁne nation-states and delineate the limits of their sovereignty.
International terrorism may be seen as posing a great threat to society.
Random ISIS attacks in a number of EU member states (e.g., Germany,
Spain, France and the UK) pose a great danger to the daily lives of EU citizens,
in addition to presenting serious challenges to national and EU policymakers.
One solution would be to develop a common strategy dealing with terrorism
across Europe. By its nature, i.e., a strategy rather than a policy, EU cooperation
on terrorism would not replace policy-making at the national level, but rather
complement it. Nevertheless, public support for such a policy goal is essential,
given that terrorism has the potential to overshadow every aspect of econ-
omic, cultural, social and political life.
Although both fear and anger are negatively valenced, they result in
diﬀerent reactions to terrorist threats (Lerner and Keltner 2000, 2001; Huddy
et al. 2005; Erisen 2013, 2018; Vasilopoulos et al. 2018). As mentioned
above, threat stimuli may be perceived diﬀerently leading to diﬀerent
emotional reactions, which in turn promote distinct proclivities. Those individ-
uals who are angry about immigration tend to perceive immigrants as an
external threat that constitutes a normative violation to the existing social
and moral order. Equally, immigrants are perceived to increase the potential
of physical harm through crime and violence, which in turn leads to heigh-
tened personal threat, growing prejudice, and the feeling of insecurity.
Angry individuals about immigration are also likely to perceive the EU’s
inability to protect its external border as a prime factor contributing to terror-
ist attacks in Europe. Such individuals will cope with the threat by relying on
previously learned routines and by seeking to maintain control full control
over the threat often with more conﬁdence and risk-taking approaches
(MacKuen et al. 2010; Suhay and Erisen 2018). We thus suggest that for
angry citizens a domestic policy on terrorism is preferred for three reasons.
First, it prioritises decision-making at the nation-state level, which constitutes
the ‘habitual’ place for policy design, approval and implementation. Second,
the ability of citizens to directly hold their own government accountable
further promotes a sense of heightened control over the policy. Third,
people angry about immigration could shift the blame to the EU for their con-
cerns on security and terrorism, and as such, a common EU counter-terrorism
strategy would be unacceptable. The EU’s foreign and distant centre of auth-
ority lacks familiarity and does not allow angry individuals to maintain control
(Lerner and Keltner 2000). From a similar standpoint, in the perceptions of
those who feel anger when thinking of the issue of immigration, a domestic
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policy on terrorism is more likely to be considered as restrictive, and thus com-
pletely remove the threat by ‘eliminating the enemy’.
Anxious individuals, on the other hand, are likely to perceive immigration
as unpredictable and associate it with uncertainty. They tend to perceive high
risks related to immigration. Unlike angry individuals, they prefer eliminating
such threats through risk-averse behaviour, caution and support for less risky
policies (Huddy et al. 2005, 2007). Anxious individuals perceive that they have
a low degree of control and strive for more security and safety. In this quest
they are more open to compromise (Brader et al. 2008; Albertson and Gadar-
ian 2015). Therefore, we posit that, unlike angry individuals, they are likely to
view international cooperation as an additional shield vis-à-vis terrorist
threats, especially given that EU cooperation on terrorism does not negate
domestic policy in this sphere. Such individuals tend to break from the habit-
ual attachments (Marcus et al. 2000). In the case of terrorism, this ‘break’ will
be translated as a departure from the nation-state being the exclusive and
habitual locus of decision-making and the support for compromise within
the framework of EU cooperation instead. For them, a common counter-ter-
rorism policy will provide consistent standards across the EU that would
likely reduce terrorist threats and increase national security (Huddy et al.
2005). Enthusiastic citizens on immigration may not necessarily link terrorism
to immigration as, often, terrorist attacks are carried out by EU nationals. We
thus do not expect that enthusiasm would have an eﬀect on preferences for a
common EU counter-terrorism strategy.
Hypothesis 2: Those who feel angry about immigration are less likely to support a
common EU counter-terrorism strategy (2a) whereas those who feel anxious about
immigration are more likely to support it (2b).
Finally, whereas some individuals may have clear preferences on both policies
and view them as complementary, i.e., support or oppose both, we also want
to consider the possibility that some individuals may support one policy but
reject the other (see also Erisen and Erisen 2014; Hobolt 2014; Vasilopoulou
and Keith 2019). EU cooperation on immigration policy may not be seen as
complementary to EU cooperation in the ﬁeld of terrorism. This is because
these two policies relate to and address threat diﬀerently. The intuition
here is the following: whereas for some individuals EU cooperation on immi-
gration may be perceived as a potential risk; a common EU counter-terrorism
strategy might alleviate some of the problems related to extra-EU immigra-
tion. In other words, even though a common EU counter-terrorism strategy
does not fully eliminate the immigrant threat, it may serve to contain it. The
EU becomes an additional layer of protection vis-à-vis terrorism. In combi-
nation with an immigration policy where the nation-state is the central auth-
ority, it might be the most cautious policy option. Given that anxiety relates to
risk-aversion, prevention and protection (Lerner and Keltner 2000; Huddy et al.
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2005; Redlawsk et al. 2010), we posit that the ‘domestic-level immigration and
EU-level counter-terrorism’ policy nexus would be particularly appealing to
anxious individuals.
Hypothesis 3: Those who feel anxious about immigration are more likely to support
a common EU counter-terrorism strategy and at the same time oppose a common
EU immigration policy.
Data and measures
We used a marketing research ﬁrm, PanelClix, able to draw a representative
sample of the populations of both Germany and the Netherlands. We con-
ducted the study online in the late months of 2015 and early 2016. The
German sample included 694 participants and the Dutch sample included
659 participants. An average German participant was male, 56 years of age,
with 15 years of schooling and an average monthly income of €3000–3499.
An average Dutch participant was male, 47 years of age, with 15 years of
schooling and an average monthly income of €3000–3499. Ideologically,
the average person in both samples was moderate (Germany: M = 5.11; SD
= 1.74; the Netherlands: M = 5.74; SD = 1.87) on the left-right scale, ranging
from 1 to 10 (see Appendix Table A1 for descriptive statistics).
The timing of our survey coincided with the beginning of the refugee crisis
in 2015 and the November and January Paris attacks. These events made
immigration particularly salient in party, public and media debates across
Europe. Germany and the Netherlands provide the ideal environment to
test our propositions regarding the eﬀect of emotional reactions to immigra-
tion on international cooperation. These two countries host a signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent number of immigrants and refugees giving us a powerful compari-
son. According to EuroStat (2018), Germany not only hosts a large body of
foreign-born immigrant population (approximately 15% of the population)
but also has received approximately one million Syrian refugees in recent
years. In the Netherlands, approximately 11% of the population is foreign-
born and the country hosts approximately 100.000 refugees. Despite variation
in levels of immigration, however, both countries have experienced rise in far-
right party support. The leaders of both the Alternative for Germany party
(AfD-Alternativ für Deutschland) and the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV-Partij
voor de Vrijheid) have voiced their rejection of immigrants, refugees, and
the EU. Both parties have been unfavourable towards immigration and
have criticised domestic immigration and integration policies and the EU’s
response to the refugee crisis. Equally important, the PEGIDA (Patriotische
Europäer gegen die Islamisierungdes Abendlandes) movement has held
various protests in both countries against immigration, often linking immi-
grants to terrorism.
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Measures
Dependent variables
In line with our hypotheses, we formulate dependent variables that measure
the level of support and opposition towards EU cooperation on immigration
and terrorism. To capture the level of support for a common immigration
policy (H1) we asked ‘How much do you support the creation of a common
EU immigration policy?’ on a scale ranging from Strongly Oppose (1) to
Strongly Support (5).2 In addition, to understand the perceived assessment
of the eﬀect of a common EU immigration policy on the ﬂow of the immi-
grants entering the EU system, we used the following item: ‘Do you think
that a common immigration policy will decrease (0) or increase (1) the ﬂow
of immigrants to the EU?’ To detect any potential diﬀerences of authority
on the subject we asked which of the two institutions (the EU or the national
government) should set the conditions of entry and residence for immigrants.
To assess the level of support for a common EU counter-terrorism strategy
(H2), we asked ‘Do you support the creation of a common counter-terrorism
strategy?’ on a scale ranging from Strongly Oppose (1) to Strongly Support (5).
Finally, we test the potentially conﬂicting nature of the two types of attitudes
towards these two policies (H3). We construct a variable where 1 denotes indi-
viduals who oppose EU cooperation on immigration but support an EU
counter-terrorism strategy, and 0 those who view these policies as comp-
lementary, e.g., support or oppose both processes (see also Hobolt 2014; Vasi-
lopoulou and Keith 2019). Given that we are interested in those individuals
who actually have a clear positive or negative preference on these two pol-
icies, we exclude those individuals who have neutral opinions. We also
exclude those individuals who have the opposite view, i.e., support EU
cooperation on immigration but not on terrorism, as the group is very small
(n = 7) (also see Appendix Table A2).
Measures of aﬀective reactions to immigration
We measure emotional reactions toward immigrants through a battery of
items. Each item scored from 1 (Not al all) to 4 (Very) and asked participants
how anxious, proud, angry, hopeful, worried or enthusiastic they felt about
immigration. We combine the positive emotions (proud, hopeful and enthu-
siastic) into a single variable (α = 0.80) and anxious and worried into
another variable (α = 0.85) while keeping the anger measure separate
(MacKuen et al. 2010). Our measures allow us to capture the speciﬁc
emotion elicited by immigration as opposed to general emotions. Overall,
we ﬁnd that there was moderate-to-high amount of anxiety (M = 2.56; SD =
0.92) and anger (M = 2.12; SD = 1.06) as opposed to lower degree of enthu-
siasm (M = 1.59; SD = 0.68) on immigration.
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Control variables
Our prime aim is to assess the eﬀects of emotions on attitudes towards EU
cooperation in two ﬁelds, i.e., immigration and terrorism. To isolate the
eﬀect of emotions, our models include a number of confounders. First, we
include a battery to capture the level of perceived hostility toward immi-
grants, which is one of the key antecedents of preferences towards immigra-
tion. The speciﬁc item asked respondents to rate immigrants on a list of
adjectives (Honest–Dishonest; Trustworthy–Untrustworthy; Safe–Dangerous;
Non-violent–Violent; Good–Bad; Democratic–Undemocratic) ranging from 1
to 5. We combined the responses into a single measure (α = 0.85), where
higher scores indicate greater hostility. This measure captures both substan-
tively and contextually relevant variance regarding immigration. Second, we
control for trust and identity, which are important drivers of EU attitudes
(Hobolt and De Vries 2016; Armingeon and Ceka 2014; McLaren 2002). We
separately capture trust in the national government and trust in the EU
with two items asking whether the person tends to trust (=1) or not to trust
(=0) the respective institution. We include a measure of EU identity by
asking how much the respondent is proud of being a EU citizen on a scale
of 1 (Not at all) to 4 (Very much). This measure primarily diﬀerentiates
between Eurosceptics and others. Third, we control for political ideology,
age, gender, and education. We measure political ideology by two items
ranging from 1 (Left/Liberal) to 10 (Right/Conservative). Education was cap-
tured by years of schooling. Finally, we included a dummy variable for
country to detect any potential diﬀerences between Germany and the
Netherlands.
Models
In line with our hypotheses and measures as described above, we estimate
the probability of change (from one category to the other) through ordered
logit in the models on support for EU cooperation on immigration and terror-
ism (H1 and H2). We employ a logit model in order to predict preferences for
the combined policy measure (H3).
Results
Common EU immigration policy
Table 1 reports our ﬁndings related to our ﬁrst set of hypotheses. In line with
our expectations (H1a), we ﬁnd that anger felt as a result of immigration sig-
niﬁcantly decreases the probability to support a common EU immigration
policy. Enthusiasm about immigration, on the other hand, promotes a collec-
tive policy response to immigration. Importantly, we also ﬁnd that both anger
and enthusiasm increase the expectations that a common EU immigration
policy will increase the ﬂow of immigrants coming to Europe (two middle
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columns in Table 1). This ﬁnding supports our argument that although both
citizen groups agree about the potential consequences of EU cooperation,
their diﬀerent emotional reactions to immigration result in diﬀerent prefer-
ences for where the authority for this policy should lie. The last two
columns of Table 1 show that anger towards immigrants signiﬁcantly
increases support for the national government to set the conditions of
entry and residence for immigrants. As hypothesised (H1b), anger about
immigration motivates people to prefer their own government as opposed
to the EU as the central decision-making authority.
Taken together, the eﬀect of emotions across an array of related domains
on immigration policies suggest that anger about immigration promotes
refusal of collective policies driven by the EU. In contrast, enthusiasm
encourages support for collective decision-making at the EU level. When
focused on the consistent and robust eﬀects, we see that anger and enthu-
siasm diﬀerentiate between the two cohorts that respectively oppose and
support a common EU immigration policy. We ﬁnd that anxiety is not a key
driver of such attitudes.
Table 1. Support for the EU immigration policies.
Common EU immigration
policy
EU policy increases
immigration
National government
as authority
Enthusiasm 0.281*** 0.019 0.172+ 0.340** −0.0303 0.0791
(0.0751) (0.0852) (0.0921) (0.107) (0.0877) (0.101)
Anger −0.484*** −0.216* 0.218** 0.096 0.266** 0.208*
(0.077) (0.085) (0.080) (0.091) (0.0824) (0.0942)
Anxiety −0.0920 0.0667 0.0584 −0.0140 0.131 0.129
(0.083) (0.089) (0.096) (0.103) (0.094) (0.101)
Germany 0.842*** 0.950*** −0.259* −0.235 −0.390*** −0.0874
(0.104) (0.152) (0.116) (0.171) (0.118) (0.175)
Hostility −0.601*** 0.176 0.103
(0.105) (0.109) (0.106)
Age 0.008* −0.0147*** 0.0045
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Female −0.358*** 0.129 −0.034
(0.102) (0.122) (0.123)
Left right −0.093* 0.094* 0.0942*
(0.0373) (0.039) (0.0401)
Liberal conservative −0.0513 −0.0282 0.0285
(0.0408) (0.039) (0.0395)
Education 0.0258* −0.0114 0.0246+
(0.0113) (0.0129) (0.0134)
Trust Nat’l Govrn 0.279* −0.178 0.0229
(0.128) (0.151) (0.154)
Trust EU −0.120 −0.255 0.241
(0.127) (0.164) (0.162)
EU pride 0.199** −0.160* −0.329***
(0.076) (0.077) (0.080)
Constant/Cuts Cuts omitted Cuts omitted −1.350*** −0.725 −0.0201 −0.862
(0.273) (0.542) (0.260) (0.546)
Estimation Ordered logit Logistic regression Logistic regression
N 1353 1288 1353 1288 1353 1288
Robust standard errors in parentheses; +p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
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Our models include a number of variables controlling for the main con-
founders of the relationship between aﬀect and EU immigration policy
support, including trust in the EU, EU pride, hostility towards immigrants
and key socio-demographics. Appendix Figure A1 reports the marginal
eﬀects of all these variables. EU pride is positively associated with a sustained
preference in favour of EU authority in policy-making. Hostility towards immi-
grants dampens the level of support (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014) whereas
trust in the national government marginally increases support for a common
EU immigration policy. Older male individuals are more likely to support a
common EU immigration policy. Finally, we ﬁnd a major diﬀerence between
the Germans and the Dutch. Germans are signiﬁcantly more likely to
support the common EU immigration policy compared to the Dutch, although
this eﬀect disappears when controlling for additional independent variables.
Common EU counter-terrorism strategy
Our second set of hypotheses related to the eﬀect of emotions about immi-
gration on support for a common EU counter-terrorism strategy. We
focused on the diﬀerent eﬀects of anger and fear suggesting that whereas
those who feel angry about immigration are less likely to support a
common EU counter-terrorism strategy, anxious individuals are more likely
to support it. The ﬁrst two columns in Table 2 demonstrate that there is a
major diﬀerence between anger and anxiety on the issue of a common EU
counter-terrorism strategy. In line with our hypotheses H2a and H2b, those
who felt angry about immigration are signiﬁcantly more likely to oppose
the policy in contrast to those who felt anxious. We argue that this is
because of a major diﬀerence in threat perceptions (MacKuen et al. 2010;
Erisen 2018; Vasilopoulous et al. 2018). Angry individuals prefer the nation-
state level as the habitual place of decision-making that would allow them
to take immediate action against immigration. Domestic decisions would
correct the normative violations perceived to be posed by immigration.
Angry citizens may also blame the EU of failing to provide security against
the threats of immigration and terrorism. Anxious individuals, on the other
hand, perceive immigration as something new with unpredictable conse-
quences. For them, international cooperation constitutes an additional pro-
tection vis-à-vis terrorism. As presented in Figure 1, anger decreases the
propensity to support a common EU counter-terrorism strategy whereas
anxiety increases it, while holding other variables at their mean values.
A few substantively related ﬁndings require further elaboration (marginal
eﬀects are presented in Appendix Figure A2). First, trust in national institutions
is an important predictor of one’s position on forming a common strategy
dealing with the threats of terrorism. Second, we see that older people are
more likely to support this policy in contrast to females who oppose it.
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Finally, unlike the previous model on a common EU immigration policy, there
are no country diﬀerences.
Preferences for EU cooperation on terrorism, but not on immigration
We assess the potentially conﬂicting nature of preferences regarding EU
cooperation on immigration and terrorism. Speciﬁcally, we are interested in
the individuals who oppose a common EU immigration policy, but support
the creation of an EU counter-terrorism strategy. Our third hypothesis
suggests that anxiety is the key driver of such a policy combination. This is
because anxious individuals tackle the immigration threat in a distinct
manner, i.e., they prefer the most risk-averse option. We argue that the ‘dom-
estic-level immigration and EU-level counter-terrorism’ policy nexus is the
most cautious policy option.
The logit models reported in the third and fourth columns of Table 2 conﬁrm
our expectations.3 Anxious individuals support a common EU counter-terrorism
strategy but oppose a common immigration policy. This eﬀect is maintained
Table 2. Support for the common counter terrorism strategy and combined policies.
Common EU terrorism
strategy
Combined common EU
policies
Enthusiasm −0.101 −0.194+ −0.748*** −0.524**
(0.0863) (0.0990) (0.186) (0.201)
Anger −0.315*** −0.211** 0.337** 0.0856
(0.0708) (0.0779) (0.120) (0.134)
Anxiety 0.326*** 0.390*** 0.485** 0.294+
(0.0839) (0.0939) (0.153) (0.156)
Germany 0.141 0.280+ −1.182*** −1.368***
(0.104) (0.151) (0.187) (0.280)
Hostility −0.101 0.695***
(0.107) (0.158)
Age 0.0149*** −0.0021
(0.0036) (0.007)
Female −0.342** −0.075
(0.109) (0.187)
Left right −0.0195 −0.0077
(0.0370) (0.061)
Liberal conservative −0.0727+ 0.054
(0.0401) (0.062)
Education 0.0307** −0.021
(0.0116) (0.021)
Trust Nat’l Govrn 0.483*** −0.141
(0.136) (0.252)
Trust EU −0.211 −0.0145
(0.144) (0.274)
EU pride 0.115 −0.117
(0.0767) (0.110)
Cuts/Constant cuts omitted cuts omitted −1.788*** −2.700**
(0.451) (0.853)
N 1353 1288 926 889
Robust standard errors in parentheses; +p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
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(even at themarginal level of signiﬁcance) when controlling for all substantively
relevant indicators. Interestingly, whereas anger has no eﬀect in the full model,
enthusiastic individuals are less likely to support this policy combination. Figure
2 plots the predicted probabilities of the emotion eﬀects. As we have seen from
our previous models, angry individuals have very congruent preferences. They
oppose EU cooperation on the dual questions of immigration and terrorism.
Enthusiastic citizens support EU cooperation on immigration, but not in the
sphere of terrorism. This is possibly because they do not associate immigration
with terrorism. As expected, hostility draws signiﬁcant negative weight when
examining the results on the combined policy measure. Those who are hostile
towards immigration are more likely to oppose this policy combination (see
appendix Figure A3). These individuals tend to express reluctance towards EU
cooperation. Even with the robust eﬀect of hostility in the models, however,
the direct eﬀects of emotions still hold.
Discussion
In this article we have put forward and empirically tested an aﬀective model
for understanding citizen preferences towards EU cooperation in the spheres
of immigration and counter-terrorism. Based on an original survey carried out
in Germany and the Netherlands and controlling for major confounders, we
have shown that citizens’ emotional reactions to immigration are integral to
their policy assessments. First, whereas enthusiasm about immigration
increases individuals’ likelihood of supporting a common EU-wide immigra-
tion policy, anger increases the likelihood of opposition to the same policy.
Figure 1. The eﬀect of anger and anxiety about immigration on public support for a
common EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy.
14 C. ERISEN ET AL.
Anger about immigration increases reliance on domestic rather than suprana-
tional decision-making authorities on this speciﬁc policy question. Second,
anger and anxiety promote distinct proclivities regarding support for a
common EU counter-terrorism strategy. Anger is associated with opposition
to such cooperation whereas anxiety results in support. For angry individuals
who seek to fully eliminate the immigrant threat, state unilateral action is a
conﬁdent and habitual response. Anxious citizens, on the other hand, have
a heighted perception of risk, which is more likely to be alleviated through
cooperation. Besides, a cautious approach of EU cooperation on terrorism
does not rule out domestic control. Third, anxiety increases citizens’ desire
to support a policy combination where immigration is resolved exclusively
at the nation-state level but terrorism is also addressed at the EU level. We
argue that this is the most risk-averse policy preference.
Our ﬁndings have implications for future research on European integration.
First, they demonstrate the emotional underpinnings of EU preferences.
Research has shown, for example, that Brexit was a response to economic
and cultural insecurities stemming from immigration (Hobolt 2016). By provid-
ing evidence that anger towards immigration creates strong preferences for
domestic policy, we highlight the need to explore the role of psychological pro-
cesses that motivate voters (see Vasilopoulou and Wagner 2017).
Second, previous studies have suggested that anxious individuals would be
more likely to feel depressed, lonely, and helpless. This is because they tend to
overestimate risks and perceive threats as uncontainable (Huddy et al. 2005).
However, our ﬁndings indicate that anxious individuals can also prefer
cooperation, supporting international solutions in the form of a common
Figure 2. The eﬀect of enthusiasm and anxiety about immigration on public support for
EU cooperation on terrorism, but not on immigration.
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EU counter-terrorism strategy. These ﬁndings provide new insights for those
studying foreign terrorist attacks, such as Charlie Hebdo or 9/11.
Third, our ﬁndings have implications for the Europeanization of other
policy areas related to terrorism, such as crime prevention and control. With
the Lisbon Treaty entering into force, the EU can inﬂuence national policies
and projects regarding crime prevention. However, the question about
whether the public is supportive of the EU intervening in crime matters
remains open. We demonstrate that emotions can engender a substantial
impact on how EU citizens may react to EU’s new roles.
We should underscore that we looked at the emotionality of immigration –
not only as an attitude but also as an aﬀective state. Our design has allowed us
to test our argument on two countries, Germany and the Netherlands, where
the question of immigration is highly politicised by far-right parties (AfD and
PVV). Future research should shed light on the relationship between emotions
and attitudes towards EU cooperation in the spheres of immigration and ter-
rorism in countries where far right parties do not operate. Overall, research
that considers the role of emotions on policy preferences opens up new
avenues for understanding the scope for international cooperation.
Notes
1. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-829_en.htm, accessed on 1 February
2019.
2. The EU’s common immigration policy concerns non-EU migrants. However, due
to the EU’s freedom of movement principle, immigration also occurs within the
EU. Given that the correlation between attitudes towards EU freedom of move-
ment and attitudes towards immigration from outside the EU is very low (Vasi-
lopoulou and Talving 2019), we can reasonably expect that in most cases survey
respondents can diﬀerentiate between the two policies.
3. We maintain our ﬁndings when those who selected the neutral policy position
are included in our estimation. We also conducted the same models for each
group separately (Appendix Table A3).
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